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RECENT CASE NOTES
$500 limitation is not expressed nor choses in action mentioned in the
tite.lS However, a Tennessee courtl 4 held that the title was sufficient,
being broad and general so that the exceptions (sales under $500) do not
invalidate it, and, further, that the provisions as to negotiable documents
of title were germane to the subject of sales and therefore not necessary
to be named in the title.
It would seem, therefore, that if the question of constitutionality were
brought before an Indiana court, the result would be the same as in Pennsylvania. Since there are thirty-one other states which have much the
same constitutional provision, one wonders that the question has not been
raised more often.
M. C. M.
WITNESsES-CROSS EXAMINATION-IMPEACHmENT-The defendant was
on trial for rape; at this time there were other charges pending against
him in the same court. The defendant had taken the witness stand and
testified in his own behalf. On cross-examination he was asked the following question, "Are you the same A.P. that is charged in this court
with burglary and that charge is still standing against you?" The defendant was compelled to answer this question after proper objection. The
question before the court on appeal was whether it is proper on crossexamination to ask the defendant, who is being tried on a particular charge,
if he has not been arrested or indicted on other charges distinct from
the one he is on trial for, or to so frame the question as to be equivalent
in meaning to the above question. Held: No. Reversed.1
This case resolves the doubt which has surrounded the question of
whether for the purposes of impeaching the credibility of the witness he
may be interrogated on cross-examination as to prior arrests, indictments,
and prosecutions for crimes, or as to convictions for crimes only.2 The
statutes in Indiana on the point are broad; the two statutes on the point
read as follows: "Any fact that might heretofore be shown to render
the witness incompetent may be shown to affect his credibility," and "In
all questions affecting the credibility of the witness his general character
may be given in evidence."3 The cases decided under this statutes are
not strictly in accord; the earlier cases leaning toward the rule that past arrests and indictments could not be inquired into to affect the credibility of a
witness.4 However, the later cases generally followed the rule that it
was in the sound discretion of the trial court to allow such question to
be asked.5 The principal case expressly overruled two prior decisionss
s Petty v. Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. (1924). 150 Tenn. 292, 264 S. W. 353.
2AIbid.
'Petro

v. State (1933), Supreme Court of Indiana, 184 N. E. 710.

W igrnore, Law of Evidence (1923. 2nd ed.), Vol. II, p. 392; Watson's Revision of Work's Practice and Forms (1921). Vol. I, sec. 1495.
$Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, sec. 560.
'Glenn v. Glose (1873), 42 Ind. 60; Farley v. State (1887), 57 Ind. 331, 337;
Canada v. Curry (1881), 73 Ind. 246.
5 City of South Bend v. Hardy (1884), 98 Ind. 527; Spencer v. Robbins (1886),
106 Ind. 580, 5 N. E. 726; Parker v. State (1893), 136 Ind. 284, 35 N. E. 1105;

Stalcup v. State (1896), 146 Ind. 270, 45 N. E. 334; Ellis v. State (1898), 153 Ind.
331, 52 N. E. 82; Dunn v. State (1904), 162 Ind. 174, 70 N. E. 521; Enock v. State
(1907),

169 Ind. 488, 82 N. E. 1039; Crum v. State (1897), 148 Ind. 401, 47 N. B.
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and some of the language in another.7 A late case 8 followed the general
rule of these cases and is thus impliedly overruled.
The rule of the principal case is a part of a broad field in the law
of evidence-that of testimonial impeachment of a witness by showing
his moral character. The principle behind the admission of such evidence
is that whether or not we believe a person depends usually on some part
of his actual personality. The witness' moral character is a part of that
personality, and with an insight into this, we are better able to make an
estimate of the witness' credibility. In showing the moral character of
the witness it is ndcessary to resort to some kind of evidence. Evidence
of a particular fact may be introduced to show the moral character of
the witness. Certain particular facts are not admissible for this purpose
largely because of the discrimination against extrinsic evidence. In -the
principal case the particular facts of arrest, indictment, and prosecutions
for crimes are held to be inadmissible. Thus the question involved is the
nature of the particular facts to be allowed in evidence.9
Where evidence of past indictments and arrests is permitted to be
introduced to show the moral character of the witness, extrinsic evidence
is being admitted.O The interrogation as to past arrests and indictments
is merely evidence from which to determine whether there has been
misconduct that would indicate a poor moral character and not evidence
of misconduct. Thus the admission of such evidence runs afoul of the
discrimination against the admission of extrinsic on collateral issues in
the law of evidence."' The admission of such particular facts is a violation
of the hearsay rule, since it is merely a hearsay assertion by some person
of the witness' guilt.12 When the witness is questioned on trial as to prior
arrests and indictments, he is being asked whether some one in the past
charged him with misconduct, not whether he actually did the acts. One
court said, "An indictment is nothing more than the accusation of a crime,
and the arrest is nothing more than the reassertion of this accusation.
. . .Both by statutory provisions and by general principles of the law,
every person accused of crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt
is established in a court of competent jurisdiction, by legal evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt. To allow a witness to be asked if he has been indicted,
arrested or imprisoned for a crime before conviction is to place hearsay
suspicion and malice upon the same footing with and to give the same
843; Shear v. State (1897), 147 Ind. 51, 46 N. E. 331; Rock v. State (1915), 185
Ind. 51, 110 N. E. 212; Pierson v. State (1918), 188 Ind. 239, 123 N. E. 118; Bush
v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 467, 128 N. B. 448; Denny v. State (1921), 190 Ind. 76,
129 N. E. 308.
6Vancleave v. State (1898), 150 Ind. 273, 49 N. E. 1060; Tosser v. State (1928),
200 Ind. 156, 162 N. E. 49.
7Dotterer v. State (1909), 172 Ind. 357, 88 N.E. 689, 30 I,.R. A. (N. S.) 846.
3Durke v. State (1932), 183 N. E. 97.
'Wigmore, Evidence (1923, 2nd ed.), sees. 943, 977, 979-981; Jones, Evidence
(1926, 2nd ed.), sec. 2372.
1
WIgmore, Evidence (1923, 2nd ed.), sec. 982; Coulston v. U. S. (1931), 51
Fed. (2nd) 178.
"'Jones,
Evidence (1926, 2nd ed.), sec. 2370.
2
2 Wigmore, Evidence (1923, 2nd ed.), sec. 982; Jones, Evidence (1926, 2nd ed.),
sec. 2370; Coulston v. U. S. (1931), 51 Fed. (2nd) 178; People v. Morrison (1909),
195 N. Y. 116, 88 N. E. 21.
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consideration, dignity, and conclusive character as is attached to the
solemn judgments of court . . .,,13
The majority of the courts thus distinguish misconduct itself from
mere accusation of misconduct in allowing only convictions for crimes to
be shown and not arrests, indictments or prosecutions to be shown to
impeach the credibility of the witnesses.14 However, there is a sizable
minority of the courts following the opposite result.15 The only support
for this result is that a mere encounter with the law so affects the antecedents of the witness that his credibility is impaired. Dean Wigmore
points out that while this might have been true in the early part of the
last century, it can no longer be said to be true today.16
It is submitted that the court in the principal case was correct in
changing the rule in Indiana to conform to the weight of authority since
that rule is correct on principle.
R. S. M.

iSlater v.

U. S. (190S), 1 Okla. CrIm. 275, 98 P. 110.
ilCoulston v. U. S. (1931), 51 Fed. (2nd) 178; Massenberger v. U. S. (1927),
19 Fed. (2nd) 62; Tarling v. People (1921), 69 Colo. 471, 194 Pac. 939; Groves v.
State (1932), Ga., 164 S. E. 822; People v. Brothers (1932), 347 Ill. 350, 180 N. E.
442; East v. Commonwealth (1933), 249 Ky. 46, 69 S. W. (2nd) 137; State v. Taylor
(1931), 172 La. 20, 133 S. 349; Burgess v. State (1931), 161 Md. 162, 155 A. 153;
Commonwealth v. Danton (1923), 243 Mass. 552, 137 N. E. 652; People v. Morrison
(1909), 195 N. Y. 116, 88 N. E. 21; People v. Malkin (1928), 250 N. Y. 185, 164
N. E. 900; Commonwealth v. Quaranto (1928), 295 Pa. 264, 145 A. 89; State v.
Dale (1922), 119 Wash. 604, 296 Pac 369; Thornton v. State (1903), 117 Wis. 338,
93 N. W. 1107; See Notes In 6 A. L. R. 1608, 25 A. L. R. 339.
5
2 Grossing v. State (1922), 155 Ark. 85, 243 S. W. 951; People v. Statkway
(1929), 247 Mich. 630, 225 N. W. 540; Harper v. State (1922), 105 Ohio 481, 140
N. E. 364; State v. Colson (1927), 194 N. C. 206, 139 S. E. 230; Rose v. State
(1922), 92 Tex. Crim. Rep. 560, 244 S. W. 1009. For the rule in Texas see Chandler,
Attacking the credibility of witnesses by proof of charges or convictions of crime
(1931), 10 Tex. L. R. 257.
'Wlgmore, Evidence (1923, 2nd ed.), sec. 2370.

